Parallel vote tabulation and incident aggregates. Reporter identities and voter details are withheld.
Only trained observers and civic agents file station checklists and sitreps. The desk issues a watch assignment before opening day. Phones stay in field mode; the Situation Room stays on computer mode.
Photograph or scan Form 34A/34B/37A/37B at the station. Upload immediately or queue offline. The tallying centre records importer, timestamp, and a content hash. Do not overwrite a sealed form; file a public correction if a figure changes.
Classify by the watch category list. The verification desk claims, requests evidence, verifies, rejects, or escalates to the security taskforce. Every desk action writes an immutable audit entry.
Partner organisations and accredited agents may review aggregated boards, audit hashes, and public corrections. They do not receive voter rolls, phone numbers, or unredacted reporter identities.
Operations follow the Elections Act, IEBC observer guidelines, and data-protection rules: no capturing how an identified voter marked a ballot, no publishing of personal identifiers, and no interference with polling officials. This note is operational guidance, not legal advice.
17 sealed audit entries sit on this watch. Hashes are available to accredited oversight partners. 0 result anomalies are on the internal integrity desk.
No public corrections have been issued.